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Are Presumptive Taxes a Good Option for Taxing Self-
Employed Professionals in Developing Countries? 
Daisy Ogembo 
Abstract 
Research on tax evasion by the so called ‘hard-to-tax’ in low and middle-income countries has 
largely focussed on farmers and SMEs; professionals are rarely considered in any discussion 
about the ‘informal sector’. Yet, considering their earnings, the absolute amount involved in 
evasion among professionals is probably higher than farmers and SMEs and they can cause 
serious damage to the tax systems of these countries. Researchers on tax in developing 
countries has almost exclusively focussed on multinational enterprises and challenges in the 
international tax system; but there is a growing realisation that domestic resource mobilisation 
is important and requires urgent attention. This paper makes use of qualitative data on tax 
evasion by lawyers and dentists in Kenya to argue that although presumptive tax regimes 
almost always exclude professional income, they can be a useful partial solution for taxing self-
employed professionals if they are well thought-out, meticulously designed and rigorously 
monitored. 
                                                 
 DPhil Candidate, University of Oxford. This paper is part of a larger DPhil project investigating the reasons for 
tax evasion by self-employed professionals in low and middle-income countries, and possible administrative, 
legislative and policy solutions. Various aspects of this work have been presented at the following conferences 
and workshops: Addis Ababa (November 2015), Oxford (September 2016) and Oxford (June 2018); I am very 
grateful for the comments I received from the participants. I am particularly grateful for the invaluable comments 
and ideas I received from Professor Eric Zolt. Finally, I am grateful for the financial support from the Oxford 
Centre for Business Taxation, the CIOT and the Oxford Law Faculty that facilitated this work. 
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I. Introduction  
The idea that the self-employed have greater opportunity for evasion than employees, whose 
salaries and wages are subject to employer withholding schemes, is well documented.1 The 
scope for underreporting for high-income earners like doctors, lawyers, contractors and 
consultants is often considerable, particularly when they deal with cash transactions.2 
In fact, self-employed professionals fall within a category of taxpayers known in the 
literature has the hard-to-tax, a term which also includes farmers and small and medium-sized 
firms.3 These three types of taxpayers are described as hard to tax because they share the 
following typical characteristics:4 
a. They do not register themselves voluntarily with the revenue authority; 
b. They do not keep proper books of accounts showing their income and expenditure and 
when they do, it is difficult to ascertain their accuracy; 
c. They are not prompt in filing tax returns; 
d. There is a significantly higher rate of tax evasion among them 
The choice, in this research, to focus on self-employed professionals rather than farmers 
and small and medium-sized firms is motivated by the dearth of research on professionals, 
                                                 
1 Christoph Kogler, Stephan Muehlbacher and Erich Kirchler, ‘Testing the “Slippery Slope Framework” among 
Self-Employed Taxpayers’ (2015) 16 Economics of Governance 125; Kleven Henrik Jacobsen and others, 
‘Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark’ (2011) 79 Econometrica 
651; Torgler Benno and Valev Neven T., ‘Gender and Public Attitudes Toward Corruption and Tax Evasion’ 
(2010) 28 Contemporary Economic Policy 554; Joel Slemrod, ‘Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax 
Evasion’ (2007) 21 Journal of Economic Perspectives 25; Benno Torgler, ‘The Importance of Faith: Tax Morale 
and Religiosity’ (2006) 61 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81; Vito Tanzi and Milka Casanegra 
de Jantscher, ‘Presumptive Income Taxation: Administrative, Efficiency, and Equity Aspects ’ International 
Monetary Fund (August 7 1987) WP/87/54 
2 Gunther Taube and Helaway Tades, ‘Presumptive Taxation in Sub-Saharan Africa’ [1996] IMF Working Paper 
WP/96/5, 4. Michael Keen, ‘Taxation and Development-Again’ International Monetary Fund (2012) WP/12/220 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12220.pdf> accessed 10 February 2015. 
3 James Robert Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vasquez and Friedrich Schneider, ‘'Sizing' the Problem of the Hard-to-
Tax’ in James Robert Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and S. Wallace (eds), Taxing the Hard-to-Tax: Lessons 
from Theory and Practice (Emerald Publishing Limited 2005) 
4 Alm, Martinez-Vasquez and Schneider,  in Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace (eds), Taxing the Hard-to-
Tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (Emerald Publishing Limited 2005) 3 
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particularly in the case of low and middle-income countries (LMICs). Past research on the 
hard-to-tax or informal sector in LMICs has focussed largely on farmers and SMEs.  Keen 
argues that professionals are responsible for the most serious instances of revenue loss and 
damage to the fairness of the tax system particularly in developing countries; yet since they are 
so highly qualified and tightly regulated, it often appears unnatural to refer to them as 
‘informal’.5 He goes on to explain that, considering their earnings, the absolute amount 
involved in evasion among professionals is probably higher than any other group.  
Farmers have been of interest in research on LMICS because most of these countries 
have relied on agriculture and/or cash crop farming for revenue through international trade. 
Cash crops such as coffee, tea, cotton, sugarcane and cocoa generated significant revenues for 
these countries in the past; in recent decades however, this has changed because of various 
factors including a significant drop in global prices for these crops, climate change, political 
instability, corruption, failure by these countries to mechanise and take advantage technological 
advancements in agriculture, and the global movement towards technology, innovation, service 
and e-commerce as leading sources of profit. 
SMEs have also occupied much of the research space on the hard-to-tax because LMICs 
typically have large informal sectors characterised by small-scale traders, cottage industries 
and informal public transport enterprises. There has been significant donor support aimed at 
encouraging the growth and formalisation of these SMEs as well as researcher interest in 
government efforts (or lack thereof) to tax them. 
As a result, professionals have not been extensively studied and this project seeks to 
close that gap. This research is important now, as all countries, not just developing ones, seek 
to expand their revenue base and close the tax gap to meet ever-expanding budgets and social 
                                                 
5 Keen,  International Monetary Fund (2012) WP/12/220, 16 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12220.pdf> accessed 10 February 2015. 
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needs. Global interest in taxation in LMICs has, in recent years, focused almost solely on tax 
avoidance and aggressive tax planning by MNEs to the extent that domestic resource 
mobilisation is at risk of being ignored or under-studied. This project turns the spotlight onto 
domestic resource mobilisation by searching for the barriers to compliance by self-employed 
professionals and how these can be overcome. 
Terkper explains that professionals and SMEs in the informal economy ‘have genuine 
difficulty in keeping even simple records and make little or no use of banks and financial 
instruments’.6 These businesses in the informal sector have poor management systems and 
financial structures; they are ‘usually controlled by owner-managers and a network of close 
family members, professional associates, friends and employees.'7 In addition, because the 
operations of these businesses are highly simplified, their cost of tax compliance is much higher 
leading most of them to avoid compliance altogether. 
Taxing self-employed professionals, and the hard-to-tax in general, in LMICs is even 
harder.8 These taxpayers operate mostly in a cash-based economy and either do not keep proper 
records or the revenue authority has a difficult time extracting the records from them; when the 
revenue authority does succeed in doing so, it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy and validity 
of those records.9 Since the hard-to-tax occupy a huge chunk of the economy of developing 
countries, revenue authorities are faced with a large number of individual taxpayers and the 
associated high cost of collection with the risk of minimal returns; consequently they will more 
often than not choose to pursue a small number of large taxpayers and largely ignore the large 
number of small taxpayers. 
                                                 
6 Seth Terkper, ‘Managing Small and Medium-size Taxpayers in Developing Economies’ (2003) 29 Tax Notes 
International 211, 212 
7 Terkper,  (2003) 29 Tax Notes International 211 
8 Richard A. Musgrave, ‘Income Taxation of the Hard-to-Tax Groups’ in Bird & Oldman (ed), Taxation in 
Developing Countries (4th edn, The John Hopkins University Press 1990) 
9 Musgrave,  in Oldman (ed), Taxation in Developing Countries (4th edn, The John Hopkins University Press 
1990) 297-299 
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The inability to effectively administer and enforce taxes on self-employed 
professionals, and the hard-to-tax in general, has several adverse implications for the overall 
tax system. First, treating similar taxpayers similarly is one of the cornerstones of a good tax 
system; the considerable evasion opportunities that the self-employed enjoy lead to horizontal 
inequity because while these professionals can dodge their compliance obligations, their 
salaried peers whose taxes are withheld at source bear the full tax burden. Second, the 
widespread evasion by the self-employed seriously damages the tax morale of other compliant 
taxpayers who may begin to look for opportunities to evade as well; in addition, it may lead to 
distortions in the neutrality of the tax system-taxpayers may decide to move out of employment 
to self-employment for tax rather than efficiency reasons. 
Third, while some studies question the positive effects of taxation on informal sector 
firm growth10, there is also a significant and growing amount of research suggesting that 
taxation may actually encourage firm growth by enabling those firms to access credit facilities, 
enjoy state protection, and benefit from government contracts.11 Joshi et al discuss various 
studies including: a study in Mexico which showed that formalisation of firms through various 
means, including taxation, positively affected the profits of those firms and allowed them to 
reach their optimal size12; a study on SMEs in Vietnam showed that formalisation positively 
impacts their profits and investment13; and a study on micro firms in Bolivia indicated that 
registration for tax purposes increases the profits of medium sized businesses14. Weighing the 
                                                 
10 David McKenzie and Yaye Seynabou Sakho, ‘Does it Pay Firms to Register for Taxes? The Impact of Formality 
on Firm Profitability’ 91 Journal of Development Economics 15. 
11 Anuradha Joshi, Wilson Prichard and Christopher Heady, ‘Taxing the Informal Economy: The Current State of 
Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research’ (2014) 50 The Journal of Development Studies 1325 
12 Pablo Fajnzylber, William F. Maloney and Gabriel V. Montes-Rojas, ‘Releasing Constraints to Growth or 
Pushing on a String? Policies and Performance of Mexican Micro-Firms’ (2009) 45 The Journal of Development 
Studies 1027. They explored whether there was a difference in benefits to firms that began to pay taxes to access 
the benefits of formalisation and benefits to firms that began because they were caught out by the revenue 
authority. They found that paying taxes benefited all firms regardless of the motivation for compliance. 
13 John Rand and Nina Torm, ‘The Benefits of Formalization: Evidence from Vietnamese Manufacturing SMEs’ 
(2012) 40 World Development 983. 
14 McKenzie and Seynabou Sakho,  91 Journal of Development Economics 15. 
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different findings from the various studies they conclude that there is convincing evidence that 
‘formalisation can drive broader economic gains, though there remains significant uncertainty 
about whether the smallest micro firms are likely to be beneficiaries’.15 Thus for professionals 
owning small and medium-sized business, tax evasion and operating in the informal sector may 
well be holding them back from growth, formalisation and the resulting benefits. 
This paper is part of a larger project looking at the major drivers of evasion among self-
employed professionals in LMICs, using Kenya as a case study, and what steps revenue 
authorities and policy makers can take to increase compliance among them. While the larger 
project recommends a raft of legislative, administrative and policy changes, this paper focuses 
on presumptive tax regimes and whether they are a viable option for increasing compliance 
among self-employed professionals.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section II focuses on the nature of 
presumptive taxes as well as the opportunities and risks they present; section III explains how 
the empirical work for this research was conducted; section IV summarises the major findings 
of the research; in section V we consider the suitability of presumptive methods for taxing self-
employed professionals in LMICs considering the findings of this research; section VI contains 
the conclusion. 
  
                                                 
15 Joshi, Prichard and Heady,  (2014) 50 The Journal of Development Studies 1325, 1330. 
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II. Presumptive Taxes? 
What are Presumptive Taxes? 
Presumptive taxes are not new; in fact, present-day tax systems have evolved from presumptive 
regimes over time. In the past, tax was levied based on the value of land one held, one’s 
lifestyle/standard of living, the number of windows/doors in one’s home, the number of huts 
in one’s compound (colonial British government hut tax) among other indicators of wealth.16  
In modern tax systems, the goal is to apply the tax rate to ‘a well-defined measure of 
the income earned by taxpayers...in a given period....’17 Presumptive taxation ‘involves the use 
of indirect means to ascertain tax liability, which differ from the usual rules based on the 
taxpayer’s accounts’.18 In presumptive tax regime, the ‘‘desired’ base for taxation...is not itself 
measured but is inferred from some simple indicators which are more easily measured than the 
base itself.’19 The presumption therefore replaces ‘an entire tax base or at least a large portion 
of the base’.20 In other words, where the revenue authority cannot ascertain a taxpayer’s 
income, or cannot verify the accuracy thereof, presumptive regimes allow them to presume the 
amount of income based on alternative observable indicators, i.e., an alternative base 
determined by the revenue authority21. 
Thuronyi provides a helpful discussion on the various legal characteristics of 
presumptive taxation methods. The legal presumption that the taxpayer’s income is no less than 
                                                 
16 Tanzi and Jantscher,  International Monetary Fund (August 7 1987) WP/87/54 
17 Tanzi and Jantscher,  International Monetary Fund (August 7 1987) WP/87/54 
18 Victor Thuronyi (ed) Tax Law Design and Drafting (Kluwer Law International 2000) 401. 
19 E. Ahmad and N. Stern, The Theory and Practice of Tax Reform in Developing Countries (Cambridge 
University Press 1991) cited in Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 401. 
20 International Fiscal Association (ed) Presumptive Income Taxation: Proceedings of a Seminar Held in New 
Delhi, in 1997 During the 51st Congress of the International Fiscal Association (Springer Netherlands 1998) 1. 
21 Richard M. Bird and Sally Wallace, ‘Is it Really so Hard to Tax the Hard-to-Tax? The Context and Role of 
Presumptive Taxes’ in Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (2005) 2 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S0573-8555%2804%2968806-7>  
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what is assessed using the alternative indicators may or may not be rebuttable.22 Where they 
are not rebuttable- legally binding and not appealable- this should be clearly specified in the 
relevant legal instrument and defined precisely.23 Where they are rebuttable, the revenue 
authority uses administrative approaches to reconstruct the taxpayer’s income and the taxpayer 
is free to appeal and supply the revenue authority with evidence that their actual income, under 
normal accounting rules, is less than the income assessed using the presumptive method.24 
Presumptive methods that are irrebuttable may be described as either minimum tax or 
exclusive. Where the minimum tax presumption is applied, the taxpayer’s liability is no less 
than what is determined under the applicable presumptive rules.25 If the tax liability would be 
higher under the normal rules, the taxpayer will pay tax according to the ordinary method of 
assessment. One the other hand, where an exclusive presumption is applied, the taxpayer’s 
liability is determined solely using presumptive methods even if the usual rules would result in 
higher tax liability.26 This type of presumption very simple to administer and does not create a 
disincentive to earn income particularly where the item upon which the presumption is based 
is in inelastic supply but they can lead to horizontal inequity.27 
Presumptive methods may also be mechanical or discretionary.28 Where the revenue 
officials have greater discretion, it is appropriate to use a rebuttable system otherwise it could 
lead to hardship, injustice or corruption. Mechanical methods are clearly described in the legal 
instrument such as where tax is based on turnover or assets; they may or may not be rebuttable.  
                                                 
22 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 
23 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 404. 
24 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 403. 
25 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 404. 
26 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000). Thuronyi gives the example of an agricultural tax based on 
the value of the land rather than crop yield. He explains further that this type of presumption results in a tax on 
the item used to determine the presumption rather than a tax on income. 
27 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 404, 405. 
28 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 405. 
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Opportunities and Risks of Presumptive Taxes 
Presumptive taxes have been used for a wide range of reasons in several countries; although 
they are found in some form in high-income countries like France, Germany, Belgium and 
Israel, they mostly feature in the tax systems of LMICs. In this section, we examine some of 
the opportunities and risks that presumptive methods present. 
Tax Simplification 
In many LMICs, there are taxpayers who cannot comply with complex compliance 
requirements and therefore whose needs are best served by simplified book keeping and tax 
compliance rules. These taxpayers tend to run micro, small or medium sized businesses with 
modest turnover; subjecting them to the usual compliance burden places an onerous financial 
burden on them leading many such business owners to evade the compliance obligations 
altogether; this problem is magnified in environments where the tax paying culture is weak.29 
For example, such business owners are often unable to comply without engaging expensive 
professional help.  
The literature confirms that even self-employed professionals who are highly educated 
keep very rudimentary, unreliable and inaccurate books of accounts that cannot be effectively 
utilised for tax assessment.30 These costs, both in terms of time and money, are very 
burdensome for a business of this size.31 In addition, in LMICs, there are numerous businesses 
of this size and the business owners will often not keep financial records for the business and 
when they do, they are often incomplete, inaccurate or deliberately misleading.32 Revenue 
                                                 
29 Bird and Wallace,  in Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (2005) 3 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S0573-8555%2804%2968806-7>  
30 Taube and Tades,  [1996] IMF Working Paper WP/96/5, 4. 
31 European Commission, Simplified Tax Compliance Procedures For SMEs (European Commission Enterprise 
and Industry Directorate-General 2007) 
32 Tanzi and Jantscher,  International Monetary Fund (August 7 1987) WP/87/54 
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authorities, with their already limited budgets, will often struggle to audit them and instead 
focus their efforts on a small number of large taxpayers. 
One of the primary goals of presumptive regimes is to cater to such taxpayers. In fact, 
all the other intended benefits of presumptive regimes stem from or are related to the goal of 
simplification. The anticipation of policy makers and revenue authorities is that if the 
compliance burden is low and the rules are kept simple, taxpayers will be motivated to comply 
voluntarily. The target in this case is taxpayers who (i) evade taxes because of lack of 
knowledge or understanding of their obligations and/or (ii) evade taxes because of the cost 
(financial or otherwise) of compliance is too high. Further, since the revenue authorities cannot 
ascertain the actual tax base because of poor record keeping, presumptive regimes allow them 
to come as close as possible to ascertaining the income of the business using presumptive 
methods.33  ‘From the tax administrator's point of view, the key motivation behind the use of 
presumptive taxation is thus to overcome administrative weaknesses that are endemic to many 
countries in Africa’.34  
However, taxpayers engage in evasion for a diverse range of reasons including but not 
limited to these two reasons. Presumptive regimes will therefore not necessarily lead to 
increased voluntary compliance among all taxpayers; those who evade taxes because of 
dissatisfaction with or lack of trust in the government for example would not begin to comply 
simply because the process has been simplified.  
In addition, striking the correct balance when it comes to simplification is not simple. 
In many countries, the simplified regimes are still far too complex and burdensome for micro 
enterprises; on the other hand, where the regime is too simple with little accountability, the risk 
                                                 
33 Tanzi and Jantscher,  International Monetary Fund (August 7 1987) WP/87/54, 4. 
34 Taube and Tades,  [1996] IMF Working Paper WP/96/5, 11. 
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of abuse of the system by medium-sized enterprises is increases significantly.35 Critics of 
presumptive regimes rightly argue that because most of these regimes are improperly 
conceptualised and poorly designed in the name of simplicity, they result in fragmentation of 
the tax system and are inconsistent with good tax administration.36 In addition, presumptive 
regimes cannot be implemented in isolation and expected to resolve challenges posed by 
evading taxpayers; they work best when seamlessly dovetailed with other administrative efforts 
such as enforcement, taxpayer education and effective support services. 
Enhancing Horizontal Equity  
As briefly stated in the introduction, one of the principles of a good tax system is equity- both 
horizontal and vertical. Proponents of presumptive regimes are primarily concerned with 
horizontal equity, i.e., treating similar taxpayers similarly.  
One of the goals of presumptive regimes is to encourage greater voluntary compliance 
among these hard-to-tax groups to reduce the ‘unfair advantage’ that they have, i.e., that they 
can evade their tax obligations while those who are salaried bear the full burden of their 
obligations. Horizontal equity demands fairness in the distribution of the tax burden and this is 
what presumptive regimes aspire to achieve.  
Further, this horizontal equity is intended to lead to greater neutrality in the economy. 
The fact that the self-employed have greater opportunity to evade tax than salaried taxpayers 
can lead to distortions in the economy; taxpayers could choose to pursue self-employment 
instead of employment not because of efficiency considerations but because of the opportunity 
                                                 
35 Jacqueline Coolidge and Fatih Yilmaz, ‘Small Business Tax Regimes’ Viewpoint; No 349 World Bank, 
Washington, DC <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24250> accessed 23 May 2018. 
36 Bird and Wallace,  in Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (2005) 4 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S0573-8555%2804%2968806-7>  
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to evade tax. Neutrality is one of the corner stones of a good tax system and presumptive 
regimes are designed to level the play ground between the self-employed and employed. 
Presumptive regimes have, however, been criticised for resulting in exactly the 
opposite- abuse of the law, unfairness, inefficiency and distortion in decision making. Where 
the threshold for eligibility is too high, for example, larger taxpayers who are fully capable of 
keeping proper books of accounts and complying with ordinary tax rules can take advantage 
of presumptive regimes to pay lower taxes if the regime is not well designed and monitored.37 
Presumptive regimes have also been accused of eroding vertical equity; for example, where 
taxpayers in a specified occupation or sector are subject to a lump-sum tax for example, all the 
taxpayers in that sector end up paying the same amount of tax regardless of their varying 
income, business expenses, or unexpected loses. 
Expanding the Revenue Base 
The expansion of the tax base is an urgent need of many LMICs. These countries 
depend heavily on corporate income tax, value added tax, and pay as you earn from those 
employed in the formal sector. The informal sector, despite making up a very significant 
percentage of the economy, contributes very little to the tax revenue collected by the 
government. This widespread evasion is a result of complexity of the law, high costs of 
compliance, poor record keeping and low probability of detection. The intention is that once 
the tax rules are simplified and the cost of compliance comes down, those in the informal sector 
who have previously been non-compliant will begin to voluntarily comply thereby expanding 
the revenue base. 
Presumptive regimes, however, are not without their risks. There is a risk, for example, 
that taxpayers who are fully capable of complying with the ordinary rules will elect to shift to 
                                                 
37 Bird and Wallace,  in Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (2005) 6 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S0573-8555%2804%2968806-7>  
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the presumptive regime if the tax burden is lower. Thus, rather than expanding the revenue 
base, the presumptive regime would result in abuse of the tax system and erosion of the existing 
base. In addition, if the presumptive regime does not have an inbuilt sunset clause, businesses 
can manipulate their affairs to remain within the ambit of the presumptive regime year after 
year, denying the state valuable revenue. This calls for careful research and design of the 
regime to avoid such abuse.  
Encouraging Formalisation and Firm Growth 
Rebuttable presumptive methods give these taxpayers the opportunity to provide the revenue 
authority with documented evidence that their actual revenue is lower than the revenue assessed 
using the presumptive method. Apart from generating revenue, it is also anticipated that this 
opportunity to register with the revenue authority, keep simplified accounts and pay taxes will 
enable businesses that previously operated completely in the shadows to move towards 
formalisation of their operations. Thus, they may begin to enjoy the direct and indirect benefits 
of formalisation such as better access to credit facilities, better access to markets, better 
opportunities to negotiate and do business with other formal firms and government, better 
access to highly skilled and qualified workers etc. 
Once again, the achievement of this goal is heavily dependent on the design of the 
presumptive regime. If the tax burden under the presumptive regime is significantly lower than 
the tax burden a firm would face if it grew and transitioned into the ordinary regime, there is 
little financial incentive to do so. As a result, firms will deliberately remain small or bunch at 
the tipping point into the ordinary regime to continue benefiting from the lower tax burden. 
This sort of distortion then defeats the goal of the regime and hampers efforts to ensure 
neutrality and fairness in the tax system. It is important to bear these considerations in mind 
when designing these regimes.  
16 
 
Rebuttable presumptions have also been criticised for introducing complexity rather 
than the simplicity because they require taxpayers to keep two sets of accounts for the different 
regimes to determine which one to use; on the other hand, irrebuttable presumptions can be 
legally and constitutionally challenged in many jurisdictions, particularly when they impose an 
onerous burden.38 Revenue authorities must weigh both options and determine where the 
appropriate trade off lies, for their particular circumstances.  
III. Method 
This research is based on data collected through semi-structured interviews with taxpayers, tax 
experts and senior government officials in Kenya. Kenya was selected for several reasons; first, 
it is classified as a lower middle-income country and therefore falls within the category of 
countries that this study is focusing on.39 Second, Kenya possesses a significantly large number 
of hard-to-tax taxpayers; a 2007 study found that the underground economy in Kenya is about 
20% of its GDP and has a tax potential of 4%.40 In addition, 61% of Kenyans working in the 
urban areas are engaged in the non-agricultural informal sector and the informal sector employs 
over 80% of the Kenyan working population.41  
Third, despite its significantly robust efforts at tax reform, Kenya has not managed to 
tax the hard-to-tax effectively. For example, with effect from January 2007, the government 
introduced a turnover tax with the intention of bringing the informal sector into the tax net.  In 
                                                 
38 Bird and Wallace,  in Taxing the Hard-to-tax: Lessons from Theory and Practice (2005) 21 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1016/S0573-8555%2804%2968806-7> . 
39 World Bank, ‘Kenya Data’   <http://data.worldbank.org/country/kenya> accessed 20 May 2015. 
40 Shem  Ouma and others, Estimating the Size of the Underground Economy in Kenya (Kenya Institute for 
Public Policy Research and Analysis 2007) p. 18. 
41Debbie  Budlender, ‘Statistics on Informal Employment in Kenya’ WIEGO Statistical Brief No 5 (May 2011) 
<http://www.wiego.org/publications/statistics-informal-employment-kenya> accessed 18 March 2015.; Institute 
of Economic Affairs Kenya, ‘Economic Burden of the Informal Sector’ IEA Kenya Number of the Week 
<http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/number_of_the_week/economic-burden-of-the-informal-sector> accessed 11 July 
2018. 
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both Budget Options 201342 and Budget Options 201443, the Parliamentary Budget Office 
acknowledged that despite legislative reform, turnover tax has failed to yield significant 
revenue and its implementation ought to be rethought.  These efforts at taxing the informal 
sector have focused on SMEs and farmers and excluded self-employed professionals; 
professional income is not covered by the turnover tax. 
Fourth, Kenya’s experience with corruption and its potential influence on the tax morale 
of taxpayers also makes it an important country to study. The Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, ranks Kenya at position 145 of the 176 countries surveyed 
with a corruption index of 26 where 0 is attributed to the highly corrupt countries and 100 is 
attributed to the very clean countries.44 Corruption negatively affects tax morale, destroys trust 
in government and revenue authorities and adversely affects the amount of revenue collected; 
studying the hard-to-tax in Kenya provides an opportunity to investigate how corruption in the 
country has influenced these taxpayers. 
Fifth, the electoral processes of 2007, 2012 and, 2017 and the subsequent political and 
legal upheaval are also relevant. Kenya has faced tremendous challenges in its efforts to mount 
credible and fully transparent elections. Its electoral experience in the last 10 years and the 
view by a significant section of the population that the elections have not been credible has 
certainly influenced the perception of legitimacy of the government. Although this study does 
not specifically focus on the effects of the elections on tax morale in Kenya, it is expected that 
the political experience of the Kenyan taxpayer will inform and enrich the results. 
                                                 
42 Parliamentary Budget Office Kenya, Setting the Pace for Sustainable Growth: Budget Options for 2013/14 
and the Medium Term (2013). 
43 Parliamentary Budget Office Kenya, Keeping the Promise: Budget Options for 2014/15 and the Medium Term 
(2014). 
44 Transparency International, ‘Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016’   
<https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table> accessed 2 January 
2018. 
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Finally, the researcher is Kenyan and therefore possesses a good understanding of the 
tax regime, the challenges that the revenue authority faces and has useful contacts at the 
revenue authority, treasury, tax advisory firms and the sectors that have been selected for the 
case studies. All these factors were instrumental in gaining access to key respondents during 
the fieldwork stage. 
To better understand the tax compliance behaviour of self-employed professionals, it 
was necessary to focus on taxpayers drawn from one or two professions and conduct an in-
depth study of the sectors. The researcher settled on two professions; it was felt that conducting 
research on just one profession may not be sufficiently compelling or robust while research on 
more than two professions would be too time-intensive and costly considering the finite time 
and financial resources available to complete a DPhil. The two professions selected for this 
project were dentists working in the health sector in Nairobi, and lawyers working in private 
legal practice in Nairobi. 
The data was collected through semi-structured interviews with 31 respondents-22 
taxpayers, 5 government officials and 4 experts. Most of the interviews were conducted face-
to-face; four were conducted over the telephone. It is acknowledged that this is a small number 
of respondents from which it is not possible to make generalised conclusions to the whole 
population; however, the goal of this research is to make use of the small samples to 
demonstrate tendencies that emerge within specific contexts. The small sample size provided 
an opportunity to conduct truly in-depth interviews and to tease out rich qualitative data. Doing 
so with a larger sample size would have required more time and financial resources than were 
available for a doctoral program. In addition, towards the end of the interview process with the 
taxpayers, the responses mirrored each other to such a significant extent that it is possible that 
further interviewing within the same professions would not have yielded widely varying data. 
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Dentists are an interesting case because of the highly informal nature of their 
engagements. The use of the term informal sector in developing countries typically conjures 
images of small scale traders, roadside vendors, or public transport operators. This term is 
rarely associated with professionals such as dentists yet the reality is that many of them operate 
very informally and are as difficult to tax as other informal sector entrepreneurs. Many dentists 
in Kenya work informally for other dentists or for private hospitals or clinics on a locum basis; 
some dentists are in full time formal employment with the government but have part time 
informal locum engagements as well. Locum basically refers to the practice of temporarily 
covering for another dentist who may be on their off day, off-sick, or when the clinic or hospital 
is short-staffed. Other dentists are fully self-employed and the level of formality in these 
enterprises varies widely. Dentists on locum tend to earn much more than they would if they 
were on a fixed salary and it is therefore a very attractive option, financially. 
A total of 10 dentists were interviewed for this project. A table in the Annex sets out the 
profile of the dentists according to the nature of their practice, their level of specialisation, 
gender and years of experience. 
Lawyers presented a good comparison. To begin with, it is reasonable to assume that 
lawyers have much better understanding of tax law and compliance requirements than dentists 
do; it was interesting to find out whether this would have any bearing on voluntary compliance. 
Second, the legal practice is much more formal than the dental practice. The concept of locum 
does not exist in legal practice in Kenya and lawyers in private practice are either self-employed 
or are in full time formal employment; there are hardly any grey areas. Third, although the level 
of formality in law firms run by self-employed lawyers varies just as widely as enterprises run 
by self-employed dentists, law firms tend to attract more corporate clients as the firm grows, 
thereby significantly decreasing the likelihood of cash payments and increasing the likelihood 
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of formalisation. Many large dental clinics however still receive a significant number of cash 
payments regardless of their stage of growth or size. Fourth, revenue officials in Kenya and 
across Africa with whom the researcher discussed this project were categorical in their view 
that lawyers evade tax more than any other profession. Whether this perception is anecdotal or 
fact-based is not particularly clear but it was an observation that further buttressed the decision 
to select the legal profession as the second case. 
A total of 12 lawyers were interviewed for this project. A table in the Annex sets out the 
profile of the lawyers per the nature of their practice, their years of experience, the age of their 
business, and their gender. 
Snowball Sampling 
The dentists and lawyers who were interviewed were identified and selected using snowball or 
referral sampling; the respondents interviewed referred the researcher to acquaintances within 
their circles who would be willing to be interviewed. The first lawyer interviewed was known 
to the researcher through professional networks and that lawyer introduced the researcher to 
other self-employed lawyers.  With respect to the dental profession, the researcher approached 
a dentist she knew personally but did not interview that dentist; instead, she was used to refer 
the researcher to dentists fitting the selection criteria. 
This method was very useful in this context because of the nature of the topic. Potential 
respondents were understandably wary of being interviewed about tax compliance and a good 
number went to the extent of inquiring about the researcher’s relationship with the revenue 
authority. It was much easier to access the population through referrals by their trusted 
professional colleagues. Their colleagues assured them that the researcher was ‘safe’ and that 
her questions did not pose a risk to them. This made her work easier and she could gain their 
trust and gather even more sensitive data than she set out to collect. 
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Admittedly this sampling method has its disadvantages; for example, because of 
sampling bias, one could query whether the sample is sufficiently representative of the 
population. The initial respondents are likely to have referred the research to respondents who 
share their characteristics such as age, sex, level of education and size and nature of practice. 
There is a risk that respondents with different traits were not adequately represented and may 
present different and relevant responses. The counterargument in this case, however, is that the 
legal and dental professions in Kenya are not enormous. The differences in traits and 
characteristics are not likely to be so large as to render the snowball technique useless or 
redundant. In addition, the researcher took steps to try and vary the characteristics of the 
respondents interviewed to ensure that they did not all fall into the same category; an attempt 
was made to ensure that they varied in age, sex, and nature or size of their businesses or 
practice. 
Profile of the Government Officials and Tax Experts Interviewed 
The profile of the tax experts interviewed is as follows: 
a. Public Sector 
• A Senior Commissioner at the Revenue Authority (herein referred to as 
SC-KRA) 
• A Chief Manager at the Kenya Revenue Authority (at the time of the 
interview she held the title of Manager but has since been promoted 
from that position) (herein referred to as CM-KRA) 
• A Manager at the Kenya Revenue Authority (herein referred to as M-
KRA) 
• A Director at the National Treasury (herein referred to as D-NT) 
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• 2 Senior Managers at the National Treasury (herein referred to as SM-
NT) 
b. Private Sector 
• A former Finance Secretary now working as a private consultant 
(herein referred to as (FFS) 
• A Senior Partner at one of the ‘Big Four’ audit and accounting firms in 
Nairobi (herein referred to as SP-B4) 
• A Manager at on the ‘Big Four’ audit and accounting firms in Nairobi 
(at the time of the interview she was a Senior Tax Consultant but has 
since been promoted from that position) (herein referred to as M-B4) 
 
c. Academia 
• Dr. Attiya Waris- arguably the leading tax law academic in Kenya. 
IV. Major Findings 
A selected number of the major findings of the research are presented below. 
 Peer Perception: Social Influence Theory 
Proposition: Taxpayers who believe that other taxpayers are complying, are more likely to 
comply 
It is now generally accepted, in compliance literature, that taxpayer behaviour is influenced by 
social interactions. This view is premised partly on social influence theory, i.e., behaviour and 
attitudes of individuals is affected by the behaviour and social norms of that individual’s 
reference group.45 Snavely argues that this theory applies in the field of taxation in the same 
                                                 
45 Merima Ali, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen, ‘To Pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes 
Toward Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa’ (2014) 64 World Development 828, 829. 
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way- the willingness to engage in tax evasion is influenced by one’s social interactions.46 If a 
taxpayer knows many people who are engaged in tax evasion in groups that are important to 
him -professional colleagues, family members and friends- he is likely to be more willing to 
evade as well.47 In addition to the influence exerted by social groups, the fact that one’s peers 
are also evading removes the fear of informal sanctions from peers if caught evading, a fear 
that may encourage compliance.48 Existing research also suggests that taxpayers’ perceptions 
about the probability of being detected when one engages in evasion can be influenced by 
social influences.49  
The taxpayers interviewed for this research often repeated, using different words with 
the same meaning, their belief that other professional colleagues were engaged in evasion. In 
some instances, they had either witnessed the evasion or directly benefited from it; in other 
instances, it was premised on ‘gut’ belief and insider knowledge about ‘the way things are 
done’.  
All the lawyers believed that their peers are underreporting their income, filing nil 
returns, padding up expenses to pay little or no tax, keeping two sets of files, evading out of 
both ignorance and design, demanding payments in cash to avoid paper trails, demanding split 
payments or suppressing part of the payment as well as destroying physical evidence of 
evasion. ADV002 and ADV006 said they believed that the largest firms are engaged in the 
most evasion while ADV 003 suggested that the smaller firms are the worst offenders because 
they are invisible; generally, however, there is a belief that compliance within the profession is 
                                                 
46 Keith Snavely, ‘Governmental Policies to Reduce Tax Evasion: Coerced Behavior versus Services and Values 
Development’ (1990) [Springer] 23 Policy Sciences 57, 62. 
47 Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Joseph Semboja, ‘Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in 
Tanzania’ (2001) 29 World Development 2059, 2061. 
48 Margaret  McKerchar and Chris  Evans, ‘Sustaining Growth in Developing Economies through Improved 
Taxpayer Compliance: Challenges for Policy Makers and Revenue Authorities’ (2009) 7 eJournal of Tax 
Research 171, 178. 
49 O. H. Fjeldstad, C. Schulz-Herzenberg and I. Hoem Sjursen, Peoples' Views of Taxation in Africa: A Review 
of Research on Determinants of Tax Compliance (Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 2012) 6. 
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low. Virtually all the lawyers admitted to some form of evasion, in the past or presently. A few 
confessed to keeping two sets of files and destroying tax related evidence and paper trail. Three 
respondents also spoke about lawyers hiding revenue in clients’ accounts which are protected 
by law from scrutiny due to advocate-client privilege. 
The dental practitioners were even more categorical and clear that there is very little 
compliance in their field. The perception of all the respondents is that medics pad up expenses 
to pay less tax, small and large hospitals evade customs duties on medical equipment, medical 
institutions are also engaging in evasion, and that there is widespread underreporting of income 
among dentists. One respondent, DEN 002 spoke about a previous employer (a senior 
practicing dentist) who is well known within the profession as openly engaging in tax evasion; 
the senior practitioner treats his employees as independent contractors for tax purposes (even 
though the nature of their engagement is that of employer-employee), pays the ‘employees’ in 
cash only, accepts only cash payments for treatment, and pays off revenue officials to avoid 
audits and prosecution. 
Overall, the respondents’ responses painted a picture of taxpayers who (i) believe that 
majority of their peers are engaged in evasion and (ii) know many other peers who are engaged 
in evasion; in both instances, the evasion is believed to be successful because virtually all 
respondents (except DEN008 and ADV005) were aware of a professional colleague who had 
been successfully prosecuted. DEN002 argued that the law relies on a taxpayer’s personal 
morality for compliance and felt that it is unfair for one to pay tax when others are evading. 
DEN003 said that he believes there is a lot of underreporting among dentists and there is also 
widespread avoidance among those who do not evade. DEN005 stated that he only knows one 
dentist who pays tax faithfully! 
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The perceptions of these taxpayers certainly seem to influence their choice to 
comply/evade; this was more so in the case of the dental practitioners who are emboldened by 
the fact that ‘everyone is doing it and no one has been caught’. Lawyers, perhaps because of 
their training, are more cautious about the risk of detection but are equally spurred on by the 
belief that other lawyers are engaged in the evasion game and it is simply just the way things 
are done.  Tax evasion seems to have become part and parcel of the ordinary course of business 
of these professionals. 
In my view, the consequences of not paying PAYE on my income are 
negligible. I was informed by someone who works as a self-employed 
research consultant that the fines payable if you are caught are so minimal 
that it is not worth complying. I believe them. 
The above passage contains the response of DEN002 when asked about his perception 
of the risk of detection. When the researcher asked him whether he believed that this was an 
accurate picture of the legal position, he responded that he believed her and felt no need to 
cross-check the legal position. This demonstrates the power of social influences and the fact 
that a false narrative within a reference group can easily hold the force of law and influence 
the behaviour of members of the group. It also corroborates the existing research that taxpayers’ 
perceptions about the probability of being detected can be influenced by social groups. 
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Fiscal Exchange Theory 
Proposition: Tax compliance behaviour is positively correlated with the taxpayers’ level of 
satisfaction with government provision of goods and services 
According to the fiscal exchange theory, government expenditure may motivate tax 
compliance.50 In other words, tax compliance increases the extent to which taxpayers perceive 
that they are obtaining the benefits that they expect from the government.51 Alm et.al. theorise 
that even in the absence of the risk of detection and punishment, some taxpayers will increase 
their compliance if there is an increase in the value of the goods that they receive from the 
government and will voluntarily comply so that they can receive government services.52 
Therefore, increased government expenditure may increase levels of compliance. They also 
explain that the results of their research suggest that that ‘government can increase compliance 
by providing goods that their citizens prefer more by providing these goods in a more efficient 
manner, or by more effectively emphasizing that taxes are necessary for receipt of government 
services.’53 
The basis for the fiscal exchange theory is the belief that citizens look at their 
relationship with government as a social contract; a quid pro quo arrangement in which they 
meet their end of the bargain by paying taxes and the government, in return, delivers services 
as expected.54 In other words, in paying taxes, citizens surrender their purchasing power in the 
market, in exchange for government services.55 Fjeldstad et.al., argue that the existence of 
positive benefits for the citizen would encourage voluntary compliance although that 
compliance is always varied and conditional on the government’s ‘performance, honesty, 
                                                 
50 Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg and Hoem Sjursen, (Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 2012) 4. 
51 Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen,  (2014) 64 World Development 828, 829. 
52 James Alm, Gary H. McClelland and William D. Schulze, ‘Why do people pay taxes?’ (1992) 48 Journal of 
Public Economics 21, 36. 
53 Alm, McClelland and Schulze,  (1992) 48 Journal of Public Economics 21 34 
54 Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg and Hoem Sjursen, (Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 2012) 4. 
55 Fjeldstad and Semboja,  (2001) 29 World Development 2059, 2061. 
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attention to due process and other determinants of government reliability’.56 Against this 
backdrop, tax evasion is then viewed as an attempt by an aggrieved taxpayer, who is dissatisfied 
with his terms of trade with the government, to alter those terms of trade.57 When the system 
breaks down, the taxpayers will attempt to restore ‘fairness’ in their relationship with 
government by reducing or stopping their tax payments. When the taxpayer is satisfied with 
the government’s performance, they are more likely to continue to fund it. 
From the interviews, it emerged that corruption and poor service delivery by 
government have influenced the compliance attitudes of professionals. ADV007 was 
particularly categorical in stating that he views his relationship with government as one of 
reciprocal duties and responsibilities; the people have donated power and responsibility to the 
government as an organising entity and he, as a citizen has an obligation to financially support 
this body politic so that they can discharge the responsibilities donated to them. He further 
explained that in this relationship each side should meet its side of the bargain and right now, 
in his view, the political side has run amok and cannot account for how its resources are used 
since it is not providing services such as clean water, healthcare proper roads etc. He went on 
to explain that since the government is providing services at a lower level than obligated, 
citizens are well within their right to pay taxes at a lower level than obligated. One dentist 
stated that perhaps if Kenyans had other channels for holding the government to account, 
compliance rates might increase. 
There was a general feeling among the lawyers that the tax collected by the government 
does not translate into service delivery and many repeatedly stated that they do not receive 
value for taxes paid. ADV001explained that in her view, Kenyan citizens are cheated by the 
government because they do not know how their taxes are used; there is no transparency 
                                                 
56 Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg and Hoem Sjursen, (Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) 2012) 4. 
57 Fjeldstad and Semboja,  (2001) 29 World Development 2059, 2061. 
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between the point of collection and use of taxes. Taxpaying was therefore viewed as a painful 
exercise of throwing money down a dark bottomless pit. ADV006 felt that while tax collection 
had improved vastly since the 80s and 90s under the President Moi regime, service delivery 
had not. ADV008 was categorical that corruption and failure to provide services really hinders 
compliance. 
ADV007 also argued that the Kenyan government seems to be collecting more revenue 
than it can account for and that taxpaying at a rate that supports government wastage is 
unjustifiable. These comments were based on the Auditor General’s report released a few 
months before the interview took place, suggesting that up to a quarter of Kenya’s budget could 
not be accounted for.58 
Several lawyers felt that the payment of ‘facilitation fees’ paid to a public servant (a 
bribe paid to a government officer to ‘motivate’ them to serve you) is a form of tax and that 
therefore corruption and taxation amounts to double taxation. In other words, these taxpayers 
have constructed bribery as a form of taxation and framed the payment of bribes together with 
the payment of tax as unfair double taxation. To remedy this perceived unfairness, the taxpayers 
then elect to evade tax since they cannot avoid corrupt officials if they want to receive services 
at government offices such as the Lands Office 
The dissatisfaction with government service was a recurrent theme among the dentists 
as well. DEN001 explained that ‘if we saw value for taxes, we would pay voluntarily. We do 
not see how paying taxes helps us. If we felt impact and saw changes and accountability we 
would be more encouraged to comply’. The dentists argued that the government does not 
provide the services it ought to provide using taxes, and the services most mentioned were 
                                                 
58 Edith  Honan, ‘Quarter of Kenya's State Budget Unaccounted for-Auditor General’ (Reuters, 29th July 2015)  
<https://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKCN0Q31PZ20150729> accessed 24 November 2017. 
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health care, sanitation, sewer and waste management and infrastructure. Several respondents 
stated that the failure of the government to provide these services causes taxpayer to incur extra 
expenses by engaging private service providers and causes undue suffering among those who 
cannot afford to do so. Paying privately for services like healthcare while also contributing 
towards taxes is perceived as unfair and painful; one dentist described it as ‘double taxation’.  
These responses are an indication that the professionals are unable to see the link 
between their taxes and provision of public goods thereby making taxpaying ‘annoying’ as one 
respondent put it. All the dentists who had left public service for private practice explained that 
they did so because the public hospitals are under-financed, poorly equipped and working under 
such conditions became untenable. Because of their perception that the medical field is under-
financed, they are extremely dissatisfied with the government. DEN008 described the Kenyan 
budget process as a sham. In his view, the system does not work and the government only 
makes false promises but never delivers and by evading taxes, the citizens are merely meeting 
the standards set by the government. 
Corruption 
The relationship between corruption and tax morale has been explored in various studies 
showing that corruption severely damages tax morale.59 Improving tax morale is difficult 
because it is tied to deeply rooted attitudes and perceptions; it can, however, be achieved. Prior 
to 2003, KRA would collect very little tax; they experienced a huge spike in revenue collection 
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after the 2003 national elections that were deemed the first free and fair elections in which the 
President Moi left power after 24 years paving way for a popular government.60 Taxpayer 
attitudes changed and citizens were willing to support the new government through taxation. 
This view is supported by Wilson Prichard who explains that between 1998-2002, tax revenue 
in Kenya fell drastically from 20.5% of GDP in 1995-1996 to 15.7% of GDP in 2001-2002; he 
attributes this partially to the ‘declining legitimacy and popularity of the government’ with 
those opposed to President Moi deliberately withholding tax to frustrate and undermine the 
financial stability of his government.61 In 2004-2005 however, tax collection hit a figure of 
21.8% of GDP a remarkable jump from the 15.7%; this followed the election of Mwai Kibaki 
under a coalition government in 2002 which ushered in a period of public goodwill and faith 
in government which increased levels of compliance and little public resistance towards 
taxes.62 Prichard adds that subsequent cracks in the coalition in its third year was accompanied 
by declining revenue collections in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006.63 
In 2012 Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy were elected on a change platform- they 
promised to inject fresh young leadership, innovative ideas, create jobs for the youth and most 
important to most Kenyans- to fight corruption. Unfortunately, President Uhuru’s government 
has instead been plagued with numerous mega corruption scandals widely covered in the media 
in the past six years and he has been accused of failing to push for prosecution of senior 
officials.  
The professionals all expressed extreme dissatisfaction with government corruption and 
did not believe that enough has been done to stamp it out and they argue that this has 
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significantly affected tax compliance. However, not all respondents were of the view that 
corruption justifies tax evasion. There were three types responses to this question: one group 
felt that corruption justifies tax evasion, a second group felt that corruption explains and 
mitigates evasion but does not quite justify it, a third group felt that corruption does not justify 
evasion. Those who felt that corruption does not justify evasion had two main reasons: using 
corruption to justify evasion is unfair to other taxpayers, like the employed, who do not have 
that option; and secondly that professionals should not engage in such risky and illegal 
behaviour. Those who felt that corruption justifies evasion argued that the government does not 
promote honesty and paying taxes to a dishonest government is unjustifiable. 
Despite different views on the justification of evasion, virtually all professionals agreed 
with at least one of the following: the government is corrupt, taxes are stolen or misused by 
government, taxpaying benefits those in government but robs the taxpayer, the existence of 
corruption discourages compliance and greater government accountability would encourage 
consistent honesty. Some lawyers felt that the government has marginalised and ignored or 
victimised professionals while the medics felt that the medical profession has been politicised 
and misused. Both groups viewed this as discouraging compliance. 
The events that took place within the health sector in Kenya after the interviews for this 
research were conducted provide stark evidence of the tense relationship between professionals 
and the state. The dissatisfaction with the government was dramatically demonstrated by a 100-
day nation-wide strike by all medical practitioners in Kenya on 5th December 2016. It was the 
longest strike by medics in the history of Kenya and paralysed over 2500 medical institutions. 
The strike was based on the refusal by the government to recognise a Collective Bargaining 
Agreement signed by the doctors’ union and the government in 2013 under which doctors, 
dentists and pharmacists were agitating for improved working conditions, proper functioning 
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hospitals and increased pay. The government on the other hand argued that it did not have the 
funds required to implement the CBA. The strike was dubbed ‘Lipa Kama Tender’, a Swahili 
phrase loosely translated to ‘pay like a tender’; this slogan was intended to shut down the 
government’s narrative by suggesting that if President Uhuru’s government stamped out 
corruption, it would be able to deliver on the Agreement. The slogan was inspired by several 
major corruption scandals exposed in the media in which senior government ministers and 
officials allegedly benefitted from enormous questionable pay-outs under controversial 
government tenders, including allegedly corrupt deals under the Ministry of Health. There is a 
general perception in the country that government tenders are the quickest way to make wealth; 
the slogan therefore reflected the medic’s perception that the government is eager and quick to 
pay money under these tenders but not to provide health services. 
The strike was long-drawn out and acrimonious resulting in the temporary 
imprisonment of the medical union officials which angered the medical profession to the extent 
that even medics working in the private sector joined the strike in protest and solidarity. It is 
against this backdrop that the responses of the respondents should be viewed.  
The revenue authority is aware that when taxpayers see the people at ‘the top’ behaving 
with impunity and getting away with gross corruption, it lowers tax morale and creates a 
general culture of impunity in Kenya and other LMCs.64 It is in a difficult position because it 
has no control over how taxpayer money is utilised yet it is difficult to obtain optimum level 
of collection without controlling corruption and restoring tax morale.65 
The Ministry of Finance also acknowledges that the fact that taxpayers know they can 
bribe revenue officials if caught in evasion significantly damages tax morale; the option of a 
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bribe that would let one off the hook lowers the cost of non-compliance since the bribe would 
be much ‘cheaper’ than the penalties and other legal consequences for evasion.66 
In conclusion, it can be said that corruption exacerbates evasion in Kenya; informal 
businesses are cash-based and always liquid and can therefore easily bribe. There is significant 
evasion by ‘consultants’ some of whom are professionals like lawyers, who participate in 
unscrupulous deals aimed at facilitating/securing construction permits and government tenders 
for their ‘clients’ many of whom are politicians or politically exposed and will use that political 
power to protect them.67 The fact that one can ‘buy’ a tax compliance certificate defeats the 
whole purpose of the certificate and further erodes tax morale.68 In addition, as a result of the 
political tensions centred around contentious elections in Kenya, there is socio-political 
discontent among various professional bodies and these professionals will not pay taxes if they 
do not support the government.69 
Political Legitimacy: Public Perception of the Revenue Authority 
Proposition: Taxpayers who trust their government and view it as legitimate are more likely to 
comply with their tax obligations. 
Legitimacy has been described as ‘belief or trust in the authorities, institutions and social 
arrangements to be appropriate, proper, just and work for the common good’.70 This argument 
applies both at the national government level and at the level of government agencies such as 
the revenue authority; per Kirchler et.al., when citizens believe that the revenue authority is 
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legitimate, i.e., trustworthy, just, fair and benevolent and aims to work for the good of all, they 
are more inclined to comply.71 
Overall, the perception that the respondents have about the revenue authority is 
negative. One complaint shared by both lawyers and dentists is that the revenue authority does 
not understand the nature of their work and as a result its actions, rules and decisions are 
arbitrary, inconsistent and unfair. In addition, there is a general feeling that the authority is 
blind and aloof to the challenges that the self-employed or SMEs face that make it difficult for 
them to comply. They feel that the revenue authority is more interested in enforcement than 
supporting SMEs to comply. 
The other recurrent theme was that the revenue authority is to be feared because it is 
aggressive, disrespectful, unreasonable, scary, and has a pre-conceived negative agenda. Most 
lawyers and dentists felt that the revenue authority intends to generate such fear and does not 
want to have a relationship with taxpayers. The tax sensitisation workshops often held by the 
authority were viewed by lawyers as ‘traps’. Most of the respondents view the revenue 
authority as an enemy to be feared and avoided. DEN006 said that she fears the revenue so 
much that she cannot go to their offices to collect some tax refunds that have been due to her 
for some years. 
The taxpayers, particularly lawyers, feel that the revenue authority is more interested 
in cultivating relationships with multinational enterprises and High Net-worth Individuals 
because they help them realise their targets faster. The dentists also argue that the revenue 
authority is less interested in smaller boutique clinics and more focused on larger hospitals; one 
dentist said that revenue officials once came to his clinic and did not ask to audit any books of 
                                                 
71 Erich  Kirchler, Erik  Hoelzl and Ingrid  Wahl, ‘Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The “Slippery 
Slope” Framework’ (2008) 29 Journal of Economic Psychology 210, 212. 
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accounts which were in shambles-they were more interested in seeing his licence to operate 
which was displayed on his wall. This perception has led the respondents to believe that there 
is either no or minimal risk of getting caught and created a sense of unfairness because they 
believe that the revenue authority exists only for the good of large taxpayers. They surmise that 
the revenue authority is more interested in meeting the needs and addressing concerns of these 
large taxpayers and ignores others. 
The other public perception of the revenue authority held by both groups is that the 
revenue authority is more interested in collecting bribes than collecting taxes. The respondents 
generally all believe that revenue authority audits are merely meant to intimidate taxpayers and 
push them into paying over a bribe. Many respondents, particularly the lawyers, believe that if 
one is caught evading, one can always escape by paying a bribe. Dentists mostly believe that 
larger taxpayers pay bribes to the revenue authority to get away with evasion as well. Tax 
collection work is viewed as a tool to harass citizens and both groups construe the revenue 
authority’s work as ‘harassment’, ‘malicious’, ‘problematic’ or ‘interference’. One lawyer said 
that they came across a ‘gentle’ revenue officer, suggesting that revenue officers are believed 
to be either gentle or rough. 
Finally, the revenue authority is viewed as inefficient. Lawyers, who regularly interreact 
with the revenue authority believe that it is faster and more efficient to bribe revenue officers 
than to follow the proper channels which are viewed as slow, bureaucratic, inefficient and 
expensive; corruption is deemed to be faster and cheaper. The revenue authority is also viewed, 
particularly by the dentists, as not making sufficient use of technology. Both groups expressed 
dissatisfaction with the work that the authority does in sensitising and educating taxpayers 
about their tax mitigation options; taxpayers seem to view this as a critical component of the 
authority’s work and one that it has failed to do. 
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Low Levels of Financial and Tax Literacy 
Lawyers spoke about the fact that financial indiscipline and disorganisation within the 
profession’s self-employed, coupled with the nature of self-employment, has exacerbated the 
evasion problem. Most confessed that they tend to make haphazard withdrawals and do not 
prioritise taxable amounts thereby finding themselves without the funds necessary to meet their 
financial and tax obligations. ADV005 explained that the discipline of withdrawing money in 
a structured manner is difficult for sole proprietors and that he withdraws money monthly for 
his upkeep and occasionally makes large withdrawals when he receives an unusually large 
payment thereby making it difficult to plan for and pay his income tax. 
In addition, they complained about their lack of knowledge and expertise in accounting 
and tax computation particularly when setting up their law firms; this was a recurrent 
complaint. All the lawyers interviewed explained that their transition to self-employment was 
difficult and shocking and they were not aware of just how much their tax obligations would 
change with the transition. ADV006 was of the view that lawyers jump into setting up law 
firms without requisite training and knowledge and with the mindset that the revenue authority 
is the enemy. ADV004 gave an example of an embarrassing argument with a client who 
withheld tax on payments according to the law but the respondent was not aware that this was 
a statutory requirement and therefore queried the action. Other respondents said that 
Withholding Tax and Withholding VAT took them by surprise and that overall, their total tax 
burden was more than what they expected when going into self-employment. 
The accounting and tax illiteracy among lawyers coupled with what the respondents 
described as inaccessible tax information, leads to improper billing, inaccurate record keeping, 
and poor internal structures within their firms which then hampers compliance. SC-KRA found 
it difficult to believe that highly educated professionals, particularly lawyers, struggle with 
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financial and tax literacy; in his view, they should be the most informed group in society.72 
However, as ADV003 explained, although he knew what the law said, he was not familiar with 
the technical aspects of compliance. The revenue authority seems to be blind to this distinction.  
The lawyers argued that when they moved into self-employment, they did not 
appreciate the difference between filing returns as an employed individual and filing returns as 
a self-employed individual running a business; they underestimated how different and difficult 
it would be. The response to these challenges, they say, is to simply cook up numbers on their 
returns or file nil returns. While they readily admit that there is a mix of both deliberate intent 
and ignorance when it comes to tax evasion among lawyers, they maintain that most evasion 
is inadvertent or because of ignorance.  
It would appear, and was confirmed by the respondents, that most legal practitioners do 
not consciously develop their internal structures to enable or facilitate compliance. Those who 
cannot afford to engage a highly skilled accounting professional remain financially 
disorganised and find it hard to comply. Those lawyers who took steps to set up a proper fully 
functional in-house accounting department in turn kept proper financial statements and separate 
accounts for tax, and that encouraged and enabled compliance. 
The lawyers felt that it is difficult or close to impossible to comply without expert help. 
Several lawyers stated that tax information is not readily available and that the revenue 
authority is not digitally accessible on email to assist. They strongly felt that there is insufficient 
information for tax compliance and that tax should be simplified and demystified. Based on 
the responses, it was evident that their solution to lack of knowledge or inability to interpret 
the system is to file nil returns. 
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The dentists expressed very similar challenges; they explained that they lack the 
knowledge and skills required to run a business. Most dental clinics appear to lack financial 
accountability and proper internal financial structures resulting in widespread mismanagement, 
evasion and the collapse of many dental clinics. The medics say that accounting and 
management knowledge is not incorporated into their training program and that the Medical 
Board does not concern itself with ensuring or at least encouraging proper financial 
management structures and record keeping among its members’ clinics.  
Majority of the dentists were not aware of the correct amount of withholding tax due 
on their payments from clinics in which they locum. As a result, some were over-taxed by 
unscrupulous clinics and a majority did not receive or demand withholding tax certificates as 
proof that the amounts deducted from their pay were remitted to the revenue authority and not 
illegally retained by the clinic. In addition, many were not aware that they were obligated to 
pay income tax on the remainder of their income; some found out after several years of 
noncompliance and were either too afraid or not bothered enough to comply. Others only 
discovered this tax obligation during the interview for this research. 
Many dentists felt that tax compliance is difficult, time consuming and expensive for 
SMEs. Almost all described the system as complicated and the revenue authority website as 
difficult to use. Majority were unable to comply without expert assistance which they say is 
expensive. One respondent stated that the many dentists who move into private practice would 
like to comply but are impeded by a difficult system which they cannot navigate without 
professional help; they also describe the process of filing tax returns as an employee as being 
vastly different from the process that the self-employed experience. 
It therefore seems that financial and tax illiteracy coupled with the costs of compliance 
are a contributing factor towards evasion among professionals in Kenya, despite the scepticism 
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expressed by SC-KRA.73 Not only are do these professionals struggle to comply without what 
they deem as expensive professional assistance, they lack basic accounting and management 
knowledge that is a requisite for proper record keeping and business management. 
V. Are Presumptive Taxes a Viable Solution? 
In this section, we consider whether presumptive taxes would be a viable solution for taxing 
self-employed professionals in LMICs, considering the major findings of this research 
discussed in the previous section. 
Simplifying compliance 
When properly designed, presumptive taxes can relieve taxpayers, like the many 
respondents interviewed, who struggle with record keeping and compliance. This then 
encourages the professionals to comply without incurring the costs associated with engaging 
expert help particularly when they are newly self-employed and earning below a pre-
determined threshold. For taxpayers primarily evading because of illiteracy, this provides an 
excellent solution. To prevent abuse, however, the turnover threshold would need to be well 
thought-out to prevent taxpayers perfectly capable of absorbing the costs of compliance from 
moving out of the ordinary regime into the presumptive regime, thus depriving the state of 
revenue. Further, the presumptive tax ought to be designed with a sunset clause which ensures 
that when the taxpayer’s business grows and they can handle the record keeping and 
compliance obligations of the ordinary regime, they graduate out of the presumptive regime. 
There should be a time-limit on how long a taxpayer can benefit from the presumptive method. 
The revenue authority’s taxpayer education department ought to provide dedicated support and 
                                                 
73 Interview with SC-KRA on 10 September 2015. 
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education services to the professionals utilising the presumptive regime to prepare them for 
their exit. 
The often-favoured turn-over tax, where the taxable income is ‘no less than a specified 
percentage of the gross receipts of the business’74, may be simple to administer but is likely to 
be ineffective among taxpayers whose gross receipts are easily hidden or manipulated such as 
self-employed professionals. Since the basis for the presumption is gross receipts, it is not an 
ideal solution for instances where the audit challenge is determining gross receipts. This 
method has however been adopted for taxing self-employed professionals in India. Prior to 
2016, presumptive taxes did not apply to professionals in India, as is the case in most countries. 
Since the financial year 2016/2017, self-employed professionals, whose total gross receipts did 
not exceed Rs. 50 Lakhs in the previous financial year, can benefit from the presumptive regime 
under the new Section 44ADA of the Income Tax Act.75 The taxpayer’s income is presumed 
to be 50% of their total gross receipts for the year and since a deemed deduction for all expenses 
is applied, no further deductions are allowed. The provision further relieves the taxpayer of the 
obligation to maintain proper audited books of accounts but the presumption is a rebuttable one 
and the taxpayer can produce audited books and receipts showing that their income was less 
than 50% of gross receipts.76 This presumptive regime is not mandatory and taxpayers are free 
to opt in and out from year to year without restriction. This amendment was introduced 
pursuant to the recommendations of a committee set up to consider simplification of income 
tax in India- Expert Committee on Tax Simplification chaired by Rtd. Justice Easwar. The 
committee recommended, based on the popularity of the presumptive regime among small 
                                                 
74 Thuronyi (ed)  (Kluwer Law International 2000) 410. 
75 This covers professionals in the following sectors: legal, medical, architecture, accounting, interior design, 
engineering, information technology professionals, company secretaries, artists and technical consultancy. 
76 Income Tax Department Government of India, ‘Tax on Presumptive Basis in Case of Certain Eligible 
Businesses or Professions’   
<https://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/tutorials/13.%20tax%20on%20presumptive%20basis%20in%20case%20of
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traders, the expansion of the presumptive regime to include professionals.77 The committee 
also recommended that professionals running small businesses should be alleviated of the 
burden of keeping audited books of account.78 It is still too early to determine the success of 
failure of this presumptive regime and there is no academic literature documenting its 
implementation yet. 
Presumptive regimes such as the lump sum method where taxpayers pay a minimum 
tax, a lumpsum, set at a very low threshold may be an option for sectors where the turnover 
method would not be beneficial. It relieves the tax authority of the burden of ascertaining a 
taxpayer’s actual income through audits.79 However, they can result in very low revenue and 
vertical inequity where the income within professions diverge widely. One solution is to create 
bands within the lumpsum to account for these variations to make the tax less regressive and 
increase revenue yield.80 The disadvantage with this solution is that it compromises simplicity, 
and requires more detailed research into the income patterns and business expenses of the 
various professions, a process that cash-strapped revenue authorities may be hesitant to 
undertake.  
Peer Influence  
Presumptive methods that target and encourage compliance by those who were 
prevented from doing so because complexity would have a knock-on effect on taxpayers who 
are influenced by the actions of their peers. Once simplicity encourages higher levels of 
voluntary compliance within the profession, it is hoped that the social influence of the 
complying peers would lead to even more compliance. It is therefore a useful tool where 
                                                 
77 Expert Committee on Tax Simplification, ‘Report (Containing First Batch of Recommendations to be put up in 
Public Domain) ’   <http://taxsimplification.in/REPORT.pdf> accessed 29 May 2018. 
78 Expert Committee on Tax Simplification,  19 <http://taxsimplification.in/REPORT.pdf> accessed 29 May 
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79 Taube and Tades,  [1996] IMF Working Paper WP/96/5, 14. 
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evasion is particularly rampant and the goal is to (i) reverse the pervading culture and establish 
one of compliance and (ii) the country faces a significant budget deficit problem and urgently 
needs to increase revenue collection.  
Perhaps this was the idea behind the introduction of presumptive taxes for professionals 
as part of fiscal measures taken by Greece pursuant to measures required by Article 2 (2) of 
the ECOFIN Council Decision 2010/320/EU on 10 May 2010.81 Greece has faced a significant 
problem with widespread tax evasion especially among professionals; according to one study 
43%-45% of self-employment income goes unreported and untaxed in Greece and the primary 
tax evaders are professionals like lawyers, doctors and engineers.82 
To increase the effectiveness of this approach, the revenue authority perhaps in 
conjunction with industry representatives, would have to proactively communicate both the 
increased simplicity of complying and the increased levels of compliance within the occupation 
to influence the perceptions of those who have previously been non-compliant.  
Impact of Presumptive Methods on Public Perception of the Revenue Authority 
The current perception of the revenue authority by the taxpayers interviewed is, inter 
alia, (i) the authority is blind to the challenges that SMEs face in complying (ii) the authority 
is not keen on cultivating relationships with small business owners and is more interested in 
large taxpayers like multinational enterprises (iii) the authority does not understand the nature 
of their work and therefore makes arbitrary, inconsistent and unfair decisions.  
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A presumptive method that simplifies the compliance process for some professionals 
may play a part in repairing the damaged legitimacy of the revenue authority. Taxpayers may 
begin to perceive the authority as understanding the costs and complexity of compliance they 
face and taking steps to reduce this burden. Further, before introducing a presumptive method 
that would apply to a profession or several professions, the authority can engage industry 
representatives in a public participation process; this would provide a platform for dialogue 
through which the authority can begin to better understand the unique needs and challenges of 
the professionals and cultivate a relationship with them.  
If properly managed, this process can demystify the revenue authority and build the 
trust of taxpayers, i.e., the taxpayers will begin to believe that the authority is benevolent and 
working for the common good.83 Trust in the authority is critical in encouraging voluntary 
compliance among taxpayers. According to the proponents of the slippery slope framework, 
both power and trust can be used to achieve tax compliance but the increased use of power 
results in enforced compliance while the increased use of trust results in voluntary 
compliance.84 Thus while audits and fines lead to enforced compliance, trust and a good 
relationship between the tax authority and taxpayers including services that make compliance 
easier and more convenient lead to voluntary compliance.85 Presumptive regimes provide an 
opportunity to make compliance easier and more convenient and are therefore worth 
consideration. 
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Fiscal Exchange Theory & Corruption 
While presumptive methods present many positive opportunities for increased tax 
compliance, they are not a panacea for all ills. Simplified compliance procedures do not cure 
tax morale that has been damaged by corruption and poor performance by government. 
Taxpayers who believe that their social contract with the government has irretrievably broken 
down will not be motivated to comply simply because it is easier to do so. In fact, if these 
presumptive methods are not properly designed and monitored, taxpayers are more likely to 
abuse them even more to pay less tax. Where tax morale is low, taxpayers look for every 
opportunity to evade tax; a ‘cops and robbers’ situation as described by Kirchler.86 A poorly 
though-out and designed presumptive regime would provide the perfect opportunity for 
evasion thereby achieving the opposite of what its intended to achieve. 
Therefore, presumptive tax regimes would not necessarily encourage greater 
compliance among self-employed professionals in LMICs if the primary motivation for 
evasion is dissatisfaction with government service delivery and corruption management. 
However, where there is a mix of reasons for high levels of evasion, presumptive methods 
together with overall efforts to improve service delivery and manage corruption are likely to 
be more successful. 
In addition, some types of presumptive taxes are not suitable for countries with high 
levels of corruption and bribery like Kenya. The French forfeit method, for example, can be 
easily abused in such environments. It is a sort of ‘contract’ between the revenue authority and 
the taxpayer that involves an advance agreement between the revenue authority and the 
taxpayer on the estimated income that will form the basis for taxation for a fixed period, usually 
between 1-3 years. Since it involves negotiation and agreement between revenue officers and 
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taxpayers it is susceptible to abuse where revenue officers are dishonest or corruption is a 
challenge.87 
A better option for many low and middle-income countries would be the tachshivim 
used in Israel which was subsequently replaced by tadrihim; like the forfait, it involves an 
advance ‘agreement between taxpayers and the tax authorities’, but unlike the forfait, ‘the 
agreement is on the tachshiv in general (being negotiated with industry representatives), not on 
its application to particular taxpayers’.88 However since the objective of the tachshiv is to use 
other ascertainable factors to determine net profit, it would only be suitable for self-employed 
professionals whose turnover can be determined using external evidence.89 A potential solution 
worth exploring in future research would be to use the income earned by similar professionals 
in government employment as an alternative base in such a regime.90 In this approach, the 
revenue authority would determine what a professional with similar years of experience in 
government service would earn, and use that sum (with reasonable adjustments where the 
circumstances dictate) as an approximation of the self-employed professional’s income. A 
government salary would be a better alternative indicator than a private sector salary which is 
likely to be higher and could lead to injustice. The authority could decide to limit its application 
to professionals who are within 3-5 years of graduation and/or who have been self-employed 
for less than 3-5 years. It can also be designed to be rebuttable giving the taxpayer an 
opportunity to prove that their income would be lower if calculated under the ordinary rules. 
As stated above, rebuttable presumptive taxes introduce complexities of their own but the use 
of a government salary as a base is likely to be low enough to be deemed fair and not challenged 
but high enough to avoid abuse if well monitored and implemented. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The reasons behind non-compliance by self-employed professionals in LMICs are varied, 
complex and interconnected. There is no single solution that will address all the barriers to 
compliance and therefore a mixed-method approach is appropriate. This paper considered the 
suitability of presumptive tax regimes as a partial solution. While presumptive taxes regimes 
can simplify compliance, enhance horizontal equity, expand the revenue base and, in the long-
term, encourage formalisation and firm growth, they can also be significantly abused and result 
in inequity and erosion of the revenue base if improperly designed and implemented.  
Where presumptive taxes are well-thought out, backed by research, carefully designed 
and rigorously monitored, they can be of benefit to those LMICs where professionals evade 
taxes because of complexity, social influence and low levels of financial and tax literacy. 
Presumptive methods can also improve the public perception of and enhance trust in the 
revenue authority if they are preceded by open dialogue and fair negotiation between the 
revenue authority and taxpayer representatives and if they succeed in making compliance easier 
and cheaper.  
Presumptive taxes would not, however, be useful in countries where the primary reason 
for evasion is the erosion of tax morale by government corruption and failure to deliver 
services. In addition, in countries where bribery is a big problem, some types of presumptive 
regimes that involve discretionary action by revenue officials can be seriously abused and are 
not advisable. However, since most evasion will be a result of a mix of reasons, presumptive 
taxes can be used, in addition to other measures, to encourage compliance. Careful attention 
must be paid to thresholds and the period for which a taxpayer can be subject to the presumptive 
regime before they are transitioned into the ordinary tax system. The tax should be designed 
with time-limits, encouraging the taxpayer to become increasingly formal and develop the 
47 
 
capacity to move into the ordinary tax system within a specified period to avoid abuse of the 
regime.  
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ANNEX 
Identification Nature of 
Practice 
Level of 
Specialisation 
Gender  Years of 
Experience 
Dental 
Practitioner 1 
-Currently self-
employed 
-Runs own 
practice 
-Has previous 
locum experience 
Specialist Male More than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Currently self-
employed 
-Informal 
employment 
working for a 
self-employed 
practitioner  
-Has previous 
locum experience 
 
Non-specialist Male Less than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 3 
-Formal 
employment 
(private) 
-Has previous 
locum experience 
Non-specialist Female Less than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 4 
-Self-employed 
-Runs own 
practice 
-Has previous 
locum experience 
Non-specialist Male Less than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 5 
-Formal 
employment 
(government) 
-Engaged in 
locum 
Specialist Female 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 6 
-Self-employed 
-Runs own 
practice 
-Engaged in 
locum 
Specialist Female More than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 7 
-Formal 
employment 
(government) 
-Engaged in 
locum 
Non-specialist Female 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 8 
-Self-employed 
-Runs own 
practice 
Specialist Male Less than 7 
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Identification Nature of 
Practice 
Level of 
Specialisation 
Gender  Years of 
Experience 
-Has previous 
locum experience 
Dental 
Practitioner 9 
-Self-employed 
-Runs own 
practice 
Specialist Male More than 7 
Dental 
Practitioner 10 
-Formal 
employment 
(government) 
-Engaged in 
locum 
Specialist Female More than 7 
 
 
Identification Nature of 
Practice 
Years of 
Experience 
Age of Business  Gender 
Legal Practitioner 1 
Sole proprietor 
> 10 > 3 years Male 
Legal Practitioner 2 Sole proprietor 
 
< 10 <3 years Male 
Legal Practitioner 3 Partnership < 10 <3 years Male 
Legal Practitioner 4 Partnership 
 
< 10 <3 years Female 
Legal Practitioner 5 Sole proprietor < 10  3 years Female 
Legal Practitioner 6 Partnership < 10 < 3years Male 
Legal Practitioner 7 Sole 
proprietorship 
> 10 
 
> 3 years Female 
Legal Practitioner 8 Self-employed 
 
< 10 N/A Female 
Legal Practitioner 9 Partnership > 10 < 3years Male 
Legal Practitioner 
10 
Sole 
proprietorship 
< 10 < 3years Male 
Legal Practitioner 
11 
Partnership > 10 > 3 years Male 
Legal Practitioner 
12 
Sole 
proprietorship 
> 10 > 3 years Male 
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Identification Nature of 
Practice 
Years of 
Experience 
Age of Business  Gender 
(previously run as 
a partnership) 
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